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Abstract 
 
Much recent work stresses the role of embodiment and action in thought and 
reason, and celebrates the power of transmitted cultural and environmental 
structures to transform the problem-solving activity required of individual 
brains. By apparent contrast, much work in evolutionary psychology has 
stressed the selective fit of the biological brain to an ancestral environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness, with an attendant stress upon the limitations and 
cognitive biases that result. On the face of it, this suggests either a tension, or at 
least a mismatch, with the symbiotic dyad of cultural evolution and embodied 
cognition. In what follows we explore this mismatch by focusing on three key 
ideas: cognitive niche construction, cognitive modularity, and the existence (or 
otherwise) of an evolved universal human nature. An appreciation of the power 
and scope of the first, combined with consequently more nuanced visions of the 
latter two, allow us to begin to glimpse a much richer vision of the combined 
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interactive potency of biological and cultural evolution for active, embodied 
agents. 
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1. Introduction: a Tension Revealed 
 
There is a natural affinity between work that stresses the role of embodiment and 
action in thought and reason (examples include Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
1991; Clark 1997; Noë 2004; Wheeler 2005) and work that explores the cognitive 
role of cultural evolution (Tomasello 1999; Kirby 2002; Sterelny 2003). Both 
approaches share an emphasis on the power of non-neural structures to 
transform the shape of the problem-solving activity required of individual 
brains. Such potent non-neural structures take a wide variety of forms, from the 
biomechanics of the gross physical body (Collins, Ruina, Tedrake and Wisse 
2005), to the structural features of a linguistic code (Kirby 2002), and on to 
aspects of the local, physical and social environment (for some reviews, see Clark 
1997; Wilson and Clark forthcoming). Many of these enabling non-neural 
structures are self- or species-created, and are thus both products and 
determinants of human thought and activity. Such products and determinants 
are also subject to cycles of transmission, alteration, and inheritance, in at least a 
rough analogy with genetic inheritance systems (see e.g. Jablonka and Lamb 
2005). The result (as we shall see) is a vision of the evolution, the development, 
and the real-time unfolding of human cognition, in which a kaleidoscope of 
complex ratchet effects fuel the flexible and, to a significant degree, open-ended 
character of thought and action. 
 
By apparent contrast, much work in evolutionary psychology1 has stressed the 
selective fit of the biological brain to some ancestral environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness, with an attendant focus upon the limitations and cognitive biases 
that result. (See, canonically, Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992. For more recent 
                                                 
1 In line with much contemporary usage, we shall take the term ‘evolutionary psychology’ to 
signal not simply any psychological science that takes its cues from evolutionary biology, but 
rather a specific research paradigm centred on the work of Cosmides and Tooby (1987), Buss 
(1994) and Pinker (1997), among others.  
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coverage, see Buss 2005.) On the face of it, this suggests either a tension, or at 
least a mismatch, with our symbiotic dyad of cultural evolution and embodied 
cognition. In place of a dynamic and transformative interplay of neural, bodily 
and (sometimes self-created) environmental resources over different time-scales, 
we confront a restricted set of pre-specified adapted functions, performed in the 
triggering context of variable non-neural structures and cultural forces, by 
relatively static, genetically based forms of neural encoding and processing.   
 
In what follows we explore this mismatch by focusing on three key ideas: 
cognitive niche construction, cognitive modularity, and the existence of an 
evolved human nature. An appreciation of the power and scope of the first, 
combined with consequently more nuanced visions of the latter two, allow us 
(we shall argue) to begin to glimpse a much richer vision of the combined 
potency of biological and cultural evolution for active, embodied agents. In 
section 2 we explain the basic idea of cognitive niche construction. In sections 3-5 
we explore that idea in a variety of settings. The outcome is a clearer 
understanding of how cultural transmission and embodied cognition generate 
the first image of human cognitive systems identified above. That done, sections 
6 and 7 unpack the alternative (evolutionary-psychological) picture by focussing 
on the interlocking notions of cognitive modularity and an evolved human 
nature. In sections 8-11 we endeavour to resolve some of the tension between our 
two visions, by examining how, and to what extent, the notions of cognitive 
modularity and an evolved human nature may be reconstructed within a 
cognitive niche construction framework. This brings into focus what we, 
adapting the original usage by Lewontin (2000), are dubbing triple helix models of 
mind and cognition. These are models in which the goal is to take seriously, and 
ultimately to understand, the multiple ways in which three tangled sets of factors 
– culture, embodiment and genes – combine to make us the beings that we are.2  
 
 
2. Cognitive Niche Construction 
 
Niche construction, as defined by Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman (2000, 
p.131), refers to: 
 
                                                 
2 The idea of a triple helix in evolution was originally developed by Richard Lewontin (2000), 
who identified its components as genes, organism and environment. Our usage makes contact 
with Lewontin's own, but adapts the latter two components so as to focus on the especially 
potent and intriguing dimensions provided by embodiment and culture.    
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the activities, choices and metabolic processes of organisms, 
through which they define, choose, modify and partly create their 
own niches. For instance, to varying degrees, organisms choose 
their own habitats, mates, and resources and construct important 
components of their local environments such as nests, holes, 
burrows, paths, webs, dams, and chemical environments. 
 
Niche construction is a pervasive, though still widely underestimated, force in 
nature. All animals act on their environments and, in so doing, alter those 
environments in ways that may sometimes change the fitness landscape of the 
animal itself. A classic example3 is the spider’s web. The existence of the web 
modifies the sources of natural selection within the spider’s selective niche, 
allowing (for example) subsequent selection for web-based forms of camouflage 
and communication.  
 
Still further complexity is introduced when organisms collectively build 
structures that persist beyond their own lifetime. A familiar example is the 
communally constructed beaver’s dam, whose physical presence subsequently 
alters selection pressures on both the beaver and its progeny, who inherit the 
dam and the altered river flows it has produced. Similar effects can be seen in the 
nest building activities of many wasps and termites, where the presence of the 
nest introduces selection pressures for behaviours that regulate nest temperature 
by (for example) sealing entrances at night (von Frisch 1975).  
 
The cultural transmission of knowledge and practices resulting from individual 
lifetime learning, when combined with the physical persistence of artifacts, 
yields yet another source of potentially selection-impacting feedback. The classic 
example here (from Feldman and Cavalli Sforza 1989) is the practice of 
domesticating cattle and dairying, which paved the way for selection for adult 
lactose tolerance in (and only in) those human populations engaging in such 
activities.  
 
In all these cases, what ultimately matters, as Laland et al. (2000) stress, is the 
way niche-construction activity leads to new feedback cycles. In the standard 
cases, these feedback cycles run across evolutionary time. Animals change the 
world in ways that change the selective landscapes for biological evolution. But it 
                                                 
3 For a host of other examples, see  Laland et al. (2000), Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman (2003).  
See also Dawkins (1982),  Lewontin (1983) and Turner (2000). 
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is worth pointing out that this whole process has a direct analogue within 
lifetime learning. Here, the feedback cycles alter and transform processes of 
individual and cultural reasoning and learning. For example, both educational 
practices and human-built structures (artifacts) are passed on from generation to 
generation in ways that dramatically alter the fitness landscape for individual 
lifetime learning. To adapt an example one of us has used elsewhere (Clark 
2001), the novice bartender inherits an array of differently shaped glassware and 
cocktail furniture, and a culturally transmitted practice of serving different 
drinks in different kinds of glass. As a result, expert bartenders learn to line up 
differently shaped glasses in spatial sequence corresponding to the temporal 
sequence of drinks orders (Beach 1988). The problem of remembering what drink 
to prepare next is thus transformed, as a result of learning within this pre-
structured niche, into the problem of perceiving the different shapes and 
associating each shape with a kind of drink. The bartender, by creating  
persisting spatially arrayed stand-ins for the drinks orders actively structures the 
local environment so as to press more utility from basic modes of visually cued 
action and recall. In this way, the exploitation of the physical situation allows 
relatively lightweight cognitive strategies to reap large rewards.  
 
This is a simple illustration of the power of cognitive niche construction, defined 
as the process by which animals build physical structures that transform 
problem spaces in ways that aid (or sometimes impede) thinking and reasoning 
about some target domain or domains.4 These physical structures combine with 
appropriate culturally transmitted practices to transform problem-solving, and 
(in the most dramatic cases) to make possible whole new forms of thought and 
reason.5 The next three sections of this paper explore the idea of cognitive niche 
construction in a variety of settings.     
 
                                                 
4 The basic idea of human beings as cognitive niche constructors is familiar within cognitive 
science. Richard Gregory (1981) spoke of ‘cognition amplifiers’, Don Norman (1993) of ‘things 
that make us smart’, Kirsh and Maglio (1994) of ‘epistemic actions’, and Daniel Dennett (1996) of 
‘tools for thought’. 
 
5 It is worth noting that nothing in this view commits us to the notion of a single ‘abstract’ human 
subject rather than a population of subjects with different traits and nuances. Instead, it is best to 
think of a range of subjects displaying, as a result of genetic, cultural, and environmental 
influences, a spread of different traits and capacities. For each such trait and capacity, taken in its 
local context, there will be a correlated pattern of empowerment and constraint. The most 
successful human groups will then be those in which the spread itself (which will include 
differences in affect and affective response) is mutually beneficial. Thanks to John Protevi 
(personal communication) for drawing these issues to our attention. 
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3. Thinking Space 
 
A vast amount of contemporary human cognitive niche construction involves the 
active exploitation of space, often by way of culturally inherited artifacts and 
culturally transmitted strategies. David Kirsh, in his classic treatment ‘The 
Intelligent Use of Space’ (1995) divides these uses into three broad (and 
overlapping) categories. The first is ‘spatial arrangements that simplify choice’, 
such as laying out cooking ingredients in the order you will need them, or 
putting your shopping in one bag and mine in another. The second is ‘spatial 
arrangements that simplify perception’, such as putting the washed mushrooms 
on the right of the chopping board and the unwashed ones on the left, or the 
color green dominated jigsaw puzzle pieces in one pile and the red dominated 
ones in another. The third is ‘spatial dynamics that simplify internal 
computation’, such as repeatedly re-ordering the scrabble pieces so as to prompt 
better recall of candidate words, or the use of instruments such as slide rules, 
which transform arithmetical operations into perceptual alignment activities. 
 
It is noteworthy that the majority of these spatial arrangement ploys work, as 
Kirsh himself notes at the end of his treatment, by reducing the descriptive 
complexity of the environment. Space is often used as a resource for grouping items 
into equivalence classes for some purpose (e.g., washed mushrooms, red-jigsaw 
pieces, my shopping, and so on). Human language, perhaps the ultimate 
cognitive tool (Clark 1997), is itself notable both for its open-ended expressive 
power and for its ability to reduce the descriptive complexity of the 
environment. Reduction of descriptive complexity, however achieved, makes 
new groupings available for thought and action. In this way, the intelligent use 
of space and the intelligent use of language may form a mutually reinforcing 
pair, pursuing a common cognitive agenda. 
 
Developmental investigations lend some substance to such a hypothesis. To take 
just one example, Namy, Smith and Gershkoff-Stowe (1997) conducted a series of 
experiments involving children’s use of space to represent similarity. Very 
briefly, what the experiments suggest is that spatial groupings of play objects 
(such as  putting all the balls here, and all the boxes there) are not mere spatially-
expressed reflections of fully-achieved grasp of category membership, but rather 
part and parcel of the process of coming to learn about categories and to discover 
the use of space as a means of representing category membership. The process 
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the investigators document, in rich microgenetic detail, is one of bootstrapping 
that starts with early play experiences in which the child is interested in one kind 
of play object and hence ends up (as a side effect) with those objects grouped 
together in space. Such self-created groupings help the child to discover the 
possibility and value of spatial classification itself. Crucial to this discovery is the 
child’s engagement in preferential play in which one type of object is preferred 
over another. This kind of play was shown to lead, over relatively short periods 
of developmental time, to the emergence of true exhaustive classification 
behaviour, in which spatial organization functions as a symbolic indicator of 
category membership.  
 
This whole process is one of incremental cognitive self-stimulation within a 
partially self-constructed cognitive niche. The perceptually available (grouped) 
products of the child's own activity form the new inputs that favour learning 
about exhaustive classification and (simultaneously) about the use of space as a 
means of representing category membership. The capacities of spontaneous 
spatial classification that this developmental bootstrapping helps create may 
then further scaffold the process of learning names and labels, while the 
acquisition of new names and labels in turn promotes the exploration of new and 
more sophisticated spatial groupings.  
 
 
4. Epistemic Engineers 
 
Our second example of cognitive niche construction emphasizes the 
transformative power of incrementally organized and actively engineered 
epistemic resources in the evolution and development of human cognition. To 
bring this phenomenon into focus, it helps to introduce the notion, due to 
Sterelny (2003), of cumulative downstream epistemic engineering. Sterelny offers an 
account of human uniqueness that gives pride of place to our extraordinary 
capacities as ‘ecological engineers’, that is to say, as the active constructors of our 
own cognitive niches. Having earlier argued for group selection as a key force in 
human evolution, Sterelny notes that groups of humans engineer their own 
habitats, and that these are transmitted to the next generation, who further 
modify the habitat. Importantly, some of these modifications are to the epistemic 
environment, and affect the informational structures and opportunities 
presented to each subsequent generation. Although other animals clearly engage 
in niche construction, it is only in the human species (Sterelny argues) that we 
see this potent, cumulative, runaway (self-fuelling) process of epistemic 
engineering.  
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Niche construction is depicted by Sterelny as a kind of additional inheritance 
mechanism, working alongside (and interacting with) genetic inheritance. One of 
the points of interaction concerns phenotypic plasticity. For rampant niche 
construction yields a rapid succession of selective environments, and hence 
favours the (biological) evolution of phenotypic plasticity. Hominid minds, 
Sterelny suggests, are adapted to the spread of variation itself. To cope with such 
variability, we are said to have evolved powerful forms of developmental 
plasticity. These allow early learning to induce persisting and stable forms of 
neural reorganization, impacting our range of automatic skills, affective 
responses, and generally reorganizing human cognition in deep and profound 
ways. The upshot is that “the same initial set of developmental resources can 
differentiate into quite different final cognitive products” (Sterelny 2003, p.166). 
In this way: 
 
transforming hominid developmental environments transformed 
hominid brains themselves. As hominids remade their own worlds, 
they indirectly remade themselves. (Sterelny 2003, p.173) 
 
We see this explanatory template in action in, for example, Sterelny’s account of 
our capacity to interpret others as intentional agents. Thus: 
 
Selection for interpretative skills could lead to a different 
evolutionary trajectory: selection on parents (and via group selection 
on the band as a whole) for actions which scaffold the development 
of the interpretative capacities. Selection rebuilds the epistemic 
environment to scaffold the development of those capacities. 
(Sterelny 2003, p.221) 
 
Basic perceptual adaptations for e.g. gaze-monitoring etc. are thus supposed to 
be bootstrapped up to a full-blown ‘mind-reading’ ability via the predictable 
effects of intense social scaffolding: the child is surrounded by exemplars of 
mind-reading in action, she is nudged by cultural inventions such as the use of 
simplified narratives6 (and, ultimately, books and pictures), prompted by 
parental rehearsal of her own intentions, and provided with a rich palate of 
                                                 
6 For a compelling analysis of how involvement in a particular kind of narrative practice may 
explain the developmental path to an understanding of other minds, an understanding which 
itself turns on the construction of narratives, see Hutto 2008.  
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linguistic tools such as words for mental states. Such ‘incremental environmental 
engineering’ provides, we are told, a ‘wealth of the stimulus’ argument against 
the innateness hypothesis (Sterelny 2003, p.223). Our theory of mind, according 
to this argument, is not wired in at birth, but acquired by rich developmental 
immersion. Such immersion may itself have ‘architectural consequences’ 
(Sterelny 2003, p.225) but these are the upshot, not the precondition, of learning. 
This explanatory strategy thus depicts much of what is most distinctive in 
human cognition as rooted in the reliable effects, on developmentally plastic 
brains, of immersion in a well-engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive 
niche. 
 
Sterelny's emphasis is thus very much upon the direct neural consequences of 
the culturally and artifactually scaffolded training regimes applied to young 
human minds. But while such consequences are surely of the utmost importance, 
they do not yet exhaust the cognition-transforming effects of material artifacts 
and culture. For many of the new cognitive regimes supported by our best bouts 
of incremental epistemic engineering seem to resist full internalization. It is no 
use, as Ed Hutchins (personal communication) points out, trying to imagine a 
slide rule when you need to work out a log or cosine! Plastic human brains may 
nonetheless learn to factor the operation and information-bearing role of such 
external props and artifacts deep into their own problem-solving routines, 
creating hybrid cognitive circuits that are themselves the physical mechanisms 
underlying specific problem-solving performances. We thus come to our final 
and arguably most radical take on cognitive niche construction. 
 
 
5. Extended Cognitive Systems 
 
Under certain conditions, non-organic props and aids, many of which are either 
culturally inherited tools or structures manipulated by culturally transmitted 
practices, might themselves count as proper parts of extended cognitive 
processes (see e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998, Hurley 1998, Rowlands 1999, 
Wilson 2004, Clark forthcoming). Consider an accountant, Ada, who is extremely 
good at dealing with long tables of figures. Over the years, Ada has learnt how to 
solve specific classes of accounting problems by rapidly scanning the columns, 
copying some numbers onto a paper scratchpad, then looking to and from those 
numbers (carefully arrayed on the page) back to the columns of figures. This is 
all now second nature to Ada, who scribbles at lightning speed deploying a 
variety of ‘minimal memory strategies’ (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook and Rao 1997). 
Instead of attempting to commit multiple complex numerical quantities and 
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dependencies to biological short-term memory, Ada creates and follows trails 
through the scribbled numbers, relying on self-created external traces every time 
an intermediate result is obtained. These traces are visited and re-visited on a 
‘just in time, need to know’ basis, briefly shunting specific items of information 
into and out of short term organic memory, in much the same way as a serial 
computer shifts information to and from the central registers in the course of 
carrying out some computation. This extended process may be best analyzed as a 
set of problem-solving state transitions whose implementation happens to 
involve a distributed combination of organic memory, motor actions, external 
symbolic storage, and just-in-time perceptual access. 
 
Robert Wilson’s notion of ‘wide computation’ (Wilson 1994, 2004) captures the 
key features of such an extended approach. According to wide 
computationalism, “at least some of the computational systems that drive 
cognition reach beyond the limits of the organismic boundary” (Wilson 2004, 
p.165). The larger systems thus constituted are, Wilson insists, unified wholes 
such that “the resulting mind-world computational system itself, and not just the 
part of it inside the head, is genuinely cognitive” (Wilson, 2004, p.167). Extended 
cognitive systems theorists thus reject the image of mind as a kind of input-
output sandwich with cognition as the filling (for this picture, and many more 
arguments for its rejection, see Hurley 1998; see also Clark and Chalmers 1998, 
Wheeler 2005). Instead, we confront an image of the local mechanisms of human 
cognition quite literally bleeding out into body and world.  
 
 
6. Darwinian Modules      
 
And now for something completely different – or so it would seem. We have 
been mapping out an account of ourselves in which the human brain is depicted 
as a vortex of large-scale developmental and adaptive plasticity, positioned in an 
ongoing and co-determining interactive relationship with a dynamic flow of 
culturally evolving non-neural elements. However, what looks, on the face of 
things, to be a very different vision of our evolved neural engine and of how it 
relates to its cultural environment finds expression in the pages of the 
evolutionary psychology literature. It is time to scout that alternative vision.   
 
Evolutionary psychology starts from the assumption that just as there are 
anatomical adaptations (bodily structures shaped by natural selection to solve 
certain adaptive problems), so there are psychological adaptations (internal 
information processing mechanisms shaped by natural selection to solve certain 
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other adaptive problems). As Cosmides and Tooby (1987, p.282) put it, “[the] 
evolutionary function of the human brain is to process information in ways that 
lead to adaptive behavior”. Evolutionary psychologists argue that it follows from 
this ‘Darwinized’ conception of information processing psychology that our 
innate cognitive endowment, as shared by all developmentally normal human 
beings, is not a domain-general learning and reasoning engine (as many social 
scientists and others have claimed), but rather (to use a now famous image) a 
psychological Swiss army knife, in that it comprises a large collection of 
specialized cognitive tools. This collection of tools is depicted as a suite of 
genetically specified, domain-specific computational mechanisms, often called 
modules, each of which (i) is triggered by informational inputs specific to a 
particular evolutionarily salient domain (e.g. choosing a mate, social exchange) 
and (ii) has access to internally stored information about that domain alone. Thus 
the Swiss army knife account of mind is sometimes glossed as the massive 
modularity hypothesis (Samuels 1998; Sperber 1996). 7  
 
Two immediate clarifications of this picture are in order. First, it is important to 
note a distinguishing feature of the tabled approach to modularity. According to 
the evolutionary-psychological picture, the modules that comprise our innate 
cognitive endowment are to be demarcated at a functional level of analysis, an 
implication of which is that they need not be realized in localized regions of 
neural hardware (Gaulin and McBurney 2001). Secondly, evolutionary 
psychologists argue that in order to give an account of our adapted cognitive 
modules, one needs to identify the appropriate selective environment. This is a 
local application of a general principle. When one attempts to explain adaptation, 
one needs to have in view the “composite of environmental properties of the 
most recent segment of a species’ evolution that encompasses the period during 
which its modern collection of adaptations assumed their present form” (Tooby 
and Cosmides 1990, p.388). This crucial slice of selective history is what 
                                                 
7 Here we shall not be concerned with assessing the positive conceptual arguments or the 
experimental data that are supposed to take us from the Darwinization of information processing 
psychology to the massive modularity of the adapted mind. In general, the conceptual arguments 
turn on the thought that domain-general mechanisms in isolation, i.e. without assistance from 
domains-specific mechanisms, would not be able to solve the adaptive problems confronted by 
the  brain, or at least that any domain-general mechanism in the evolving population will 
typically have been systematically outperformed by any competing domain-specific mechanisms, 
such that it is the latter kind of mechanism that will have been selected for. For critical discussion 
of the arguments and evidence here that typically finds them wanting, see e.g. Samuels 1998; 
Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; Atkinson and Wheeler 2004; Buller 2005.    
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evolutionary psychologists call a trait’s environment of evolutionary adaptedness or 
EEA. Of course the relevant EEA may well not be the current environment in 
which a trait operates. Environments sometimes change, and evolution by 
cumulative Darwinian selection is typically thought of as a rather slow process 
that may lag well behind such change. This is especially likely in the case of a 
trait as complex as the human brain, embedded in an environment rich in 
historically unfolding cultural dynamics. Applying this logic, evolutionary 
psychologists typically argue that the last time any significant modifications 
were made by selection to the human brain’s functional architecture was during 
the Pleistocene epoch (approximately 2 million to 10 thousand years ago), when 
humans were hunter-gatherers. So the composite of selection pressures at work 
in the Pleistocene constitutes our brain’s EEA (see e.g. Crawford 1998 for 
discussion). This is where one finds the adaptive problems to which the modules 
housed by the modern brain – modules which have been inherited essentially 
unchanged from our Pleistocene hunter-gatherer ancestors – constitute evolved 
solutions.  
 
Although the identification of the human EEA with the hunter-gatherer 
Pleistocene environment is an idea that has attracted a good deal of critical fire 
(see e.g. Gould 2000, Smith, Borgerhoff Mulder and Hill 2001), it does help the 
evolutionary psychologist to account for the fact that some of our behaviour fails 
to maximize fitness in modern cultural environments. For example, modern 
human males don’t adopt a fitness-enhancing strategy of widespread sperm 
donation because our reproductive strategies are designed for Pleistocene 
conditions. And the fitness-decreasing obesity brought about by an over-
indulgence in sugar-rich foods in technologically advanced countries may be 
explained by that fact that our sweet tooth, which was adaptive in the nutritional 
challenges posed by the Pleistocene, has since been rendered maladaptive in 
such countries by the mass availability of refined sugar.  
 
This image of a species-wide assemblage of evolved domain-specific information 
processing mechanisms, meshed with ancestral environmental factors, provides 
the background to a further aspect of the overall evolutionary-psychological 
picture that will be important in what follows. Evolutionary psychologists claim 
that behind all the manifest diversity in human cultural behaviour, there sits an 
evolved universal human nature.  In what, then, does this evolved universal human 
nature consist, and how, given its alleged species-wide homogeneity, does it 
generate that remarkable diversity in cultural behaviour?  
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7. Human Nature 
 
From what we have seen so far, it might seem that the evolutionary-
psychological notion of an evolved universal human nature will be cashed out in 
terms of a suite of Darwinian modules possessed by all developmentally normal 
adult human beings. However, we need to be careful in how we handle this idea, 
because the fact is that that suite of modules, even as portrayed in evolutionary 
psychology, is not strictly universal. For example, whether or not a particular 
psychological adaptation is ultimately ‘wired up’ in a certain way in a specific 
individual will typically depend on the presence of certain environmental 
triggers that, under normal circumstances, occur reliably at critical stages during 
development. (For a dramatic example, consider the need for a rich linguistic 
environment to be present during language development.) Moreover, there may 
be alternative psychological adaptations available to development that are under 
the control of genetic switches (roughly, mechanisms by which genes are turned 
on or off through the absence or presence of DNA binding proteins). Indeed, 
evolutionary psychologists argue that men and women confront divergent, sex-
relative adaptive problems when it comes to finding, holding onto, and 
reproducing with a mate. Thus men and women instantiate different, sex-relative 
psychological adaptations in the mating game. Since sex determination is under 
the control of a genetic switch, so are these alternative psychological 
architectures.  
 
What the existence of such alternative developmental trajectories demonstrates is 
that the suite of cognitive modules possessed by humankind isn’t strictly 
universal and so cannot constitute our species-wide human nature. What might 
then? The answer, nicely isolated by Buller (2005), is an evolved species-wide set 
of genetically specified developmental programs that (a) determine how the 
emerging human phenotype responds to critical environmental triggers and (b) 
control processes such as genetic switching. It’s at that level that strict 
universality (allegedly) holds, and at which our evolved human nature is 
(allegedly) to be found.  
 
Now, if all developmentally normal human beings share a set of genetically 
specified developmental programs and, as a result, at least a very large number 
of innately specified psychological adaptations meshed with ancestral 
environments, what explains the variability of human behaviour across 
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contemporary cultures? Here we can draw a lesson from the example of ordinary 
digital computer programs. Like such programs, our cognitive information 
processing modules may respond differentially to variations in the inputs that 
they receive, inputs that are supplied largely by the particular cultural 
environments in which the bearers of those modules are embedded. A 
developmental version of this process is equally important. In certain cases, a 
particular innately specified module (e.g. a Chomskyan language acquisition 
device) may be exposed to different developmental environments (different 
linguistic communities providing different developmental inputs), leading 
ultimately to cognitive variation (different speakers learning and producing 
different languages).  
 
Our second vision has now emerged fully. It is at root a vision of the evolved 
human brain as a locus of relatively static, genetically based forms of neural 
encoding and processing, executing a restricted set of pre-specified adapted 
functions in response to the triggers provided by variable cultural inputs. This 
certainly seems to suggest a very different view of what it is to be a natural 
human thinker than the one evoked by our synthesis of embodied and extended 
cognition, cultural evolution and cognitive niche construction. But just how 
much of an intellectual chasm really exists between these apparently divergent 
views? In other words, along which dimensions, and to what extent, are our two 
visions in genuine competition with each other? It is to this issue that we shall 
now turn.  
 
 
8. Remoulding Modularity 
 
What seems clear is that there is no necessary tension between, on the one hand, 
an approach that foregrounds cultural evolution and, on the other, the kind of 
cognitive modularity favoured by the evolutionary psychologists. This might 
seem an odd claim to make at first, given that the fans of cultural evolution often 
place an emphasis on psychological mechanisms that exhibit a robust kind of 
domain-generality. For example, drawing on Boyd and Richerson’s (1985) dual 
inheritance model, a model which (like Sterelny’s approach sketched earlier) 
stresses cultural as well as genetic transmission in evolution, Coultas (2004) 
provides experimental evidence that individual human beings have an 
essentially domain-general tendency to conform in social groups, a tendency that 
can be adaptive for the individual when information-gathering by that 
individual would be costly. And Tomasello (1999), in a treatment that also 
stresses dual inheritance, argues that evolution has endowed us with a set of 
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basic cognitive capacities, including shared attention and the imitation of other 
humans’ behaviours and intentions, that allow us to take developmental 
advantage of a kind of accumulated species-specific knowledge made available 
through human cultural environments. At the heart of this process, and the 
capacity that sets human beings apart from other species, is our ability to identify 
intentions in others. It’s this uniquely human, essentially domain-general ability, 
argues Tomasello, that allows us to build on foundational capacities that we 
share with other animals (such as the capacities for tool-use and signalling), in 
order to become vastly more sophisticated thinkers in specific domains (e.g. 
vastly more sophisticated tool-users and signallers) than have our evolutionary 
cousins. Finally, as we have seen already, Sterelny (2003) offers an account of our 
capacity to interpret others as intentional agents, according to which basic 
perceptual adaptations are bootstrapped up to a full-blown ‘mind-reading’ 
ability via cognitive niche construction. This contrasts sharply with the 
evolutionary-psychological idea of an innate ‘folk psychology’ module, in the 
form of a domain-specific adaptation for ‘mind-reading’.  
 
That said, Atran presents an alternative view of the relationship between cultural 
transmission and cognitive modularity in which the latter underlies the former, 
with certain  modules serving as “as a principled basis for transmission and 
acquisition of more variable and extended forms of cultural knowledge” (Atran 
2001, p.8). For example, he argues that the widespread anthropological 
phenomenon of totemism – religious systems in which generic species spiritually 
represent social groups (e.g. an animal that spiritually represents a clan) – 
piggybacks on a genetically specified folk biology module. That module latches 
onto generic species (and groups of generic species) whose intrinsically well-
structured character renders them apt for memorability and cultural 
transmission between minds. These underlying categories supply cognitive 
hooks onto which our minds subsequently hang beliefs about intrinsically less 
well-structured social groups. In sum, according to Atran (2001, p.8): 
 
modularized structures – such as those which produce 
folkmechanical, folkpsychological and folkbiological concepts – are 
special players in cultural evolution. Their native stability 
derivatively attaches to more variable and difficult-to-learn 
representational forms, thus enhancing the latter’s prospects for 
regularity and recurrence in transmission within and across cultures. 
 
The availability of these alternative positions within the evolution-of-cognition 
research programme suggests strongly that one cannot infer that a cognitive 
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architecture will be non-modular, or indeed that it will be modular, simply from 
the existence or otherwise of cultural transmission in the inheritance system. 
 
Cognitive modularity is also compatible with the other partner in our symbiotic 
dyad, an embodied-extended approach to mind. A powerful illustration of how 
an embodied-extended modularity might go is provided by the field of situated 
robotics (e.g. Brooks 1991, Mataric 1991, Pfeifer and Bongard 2007). With the goal 
of building complete agents that are capable of integrating perception and action 
in real time so as to generate fast and fluid embodied adaptive behaviour, 
researchers in situated robotics shun the classical cognitive-scientific reliance on 
detailed internal world models, on the grounds that such structures are 
computationally expensive to build and keep up to date. Instead they adopt a 
design strategy according to which the robot regularly senses its environment to 
guide its action. It is this specific behaviour-generating strategy that marks out a 
robot as situated (Brooks 1991).  Against this background, one of the key ideas 
from the field is that much of the richness and flexibility of intelligence is down 
not to general-purpose processes of reasoning and inference, but rather to 
integrated suites of special-purpose adaptive couplings that realize distributed or 
extended behaviour-generating strategies by combining non-trivial causal 
contributions from three constituencies – the brain (or its robotic equivalent), the 
non-neural body, and the environment. Moreover, this perspective provides one 
platform for the previously mentioned refusal to conceptualize perception and 
action as interfaces between mind and world. As Brooks (1991, p.173) puts it, one 
of the guiding principles of the approach is that: “There is no separation into 
perceptual system, central system, and actuation system. Pieces of the network 
[the distributed robotic control system] may perform more than one of these 
functions. More importantly, there is intimate intertwining of aspects of all three 
of them.”  
 
A classic example of such work is provided by Maja Mataric’s sonar-driven 
mobile robot, Toto (Mataric 1991). Toto wanders around its office environment 
following walls and avoiding obstacles. As it proceeds it constructs an internal 
map based on landmarks, which then enables it to navigate between locations. 
Toto is controlled by three main layers of situated special-purpose adaptive 
coupling: collision-free wandering, landmark detection, and map learning and 
path planning. What is theoretically interesting about Toto’s map-learning and 
path-planning system is that navigation-related information is encoded in it in 
terms of patterns of embodied sensorimotor activity. For example, if, as Toto 
moves, it keeps detecting proximally located objects on its right hand side, while 
its compass bearing remains unchanged, then a ‘right-wall’ is encoded in its 
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inner map, not as some agent-independent objectively specified entity, but in 
terms of its sensorimotor ‘experience’ at the time. These structured sensorimotor 
‘experiences’ (Toto’s landmarks) are stored as connected nodes in a distributed 
graph, and this record of the robot’s own embodied sensorimotor history 
constitutes its inner map of the spatial environment. 
 
Crucially, given our interests, Toto’s strategy of encoding spatial paths as 
internally represented sequences of past, current, and expected embodied 
sensorimotor ‘experiences’ is a domain-specific solution, one tailored to the 
particular navigational context for which the robot is designed. The action-
oriented structures in question presumably wouldn’t be much good for a vast 
range of other space-related purposes, such as ordering correctly-sized carpets 
for the corridors or determining the precise distance to the snack bar. Moreover, 
the navigation system is informationally encapsulated, in just the way required 
by the modularity hypothesis. (Of course, the map-learning and path-planning 
system depends on the successful functioning of the other layers of coupling, but 
informational encapsulation does not rule out such inter-systemic dependencies.) 
What all this suggests is that the sorts of situated special-purpose adaptive 
couplings promoted within situated robotics are illuminatingly understood as 
cognitive modules. Crucially, however, these modules have (what we might call) 
a horizontally extended character, in that their functional boundaries are no 
longer constrained by the orthodox transitions that remain in force in 
mainstream evolutionary psychology, between (i) perception and thought (in the 
world-to-body-to-mind input direction) and (ii) thought and action (in the mind-
to-body-to-world output direction).    
 
To develop further this notion of horizontally extended cognitive modularity, 
consider Ziemke, Bergfeldt, Buason, Susi and Svensson’s (2004) co-evolutionary 
experiment involving two sets of simulated robots – scouts and drones – whose 
co-operation-demanding task is to enable the drones to find a spatially located 
goal. Both sets of agents are controlled by simple fixed topology neural networks 
under artificial evolutionary control. The task is posed in a grey-walled 
environment, in which each junction requiring a left turn to reach the goal is 
marked with a white stripe, while each junction requiring a right turn is marked 
with a black stripe. Scouts have cameras and so, in principle, can find their way 
to the goal autonomously using the turn-signalling stripes. By contrast, the 
drones have no cameras, only light sensors, so they cannot see the stripes. Their 
only hope, beyond random search, is to evolve to respond correctly to light 
sources that are deposited by the scouts as the latter traverse the environment. So 
the scouts need to evolve a cognitive niche construction strategy, one in which 
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they place the light sources in such a way that they produce an increase in (what 
Ziemke et al. call) the cognitive congeniality of the environment inherited by the 
drones.8  
 
Under the experimental conditions described, scouts evolve to drop light sources 
in response to the white stripe on the wall – thereby constructing a niche that 
simplifies the problem task for the drones – and drones evolve to exploit these 
‘road signs’, by turning left while sensing the light, but right at the other 
junctions. This niche-construction scenario once again displays the distinctive 
hallmarks of situated special-purpose adaptive coupling (e.g. tight linkages 
between particular embodied sensorimotor capacities and task-dedicated action-
generating strategies that factor in the reliable presence of specific environmental 
structures) and thereby of horizontally extended modularity.9  
 
In spite of these positive steps towards a reconciliation between an approach that 
emphasizes cognitive modularity and one that emphasizes cultural transmission 
and the embodied-extended mind, an important issue remains to be addressed. 
As we have seen, evolutionary psychologists explain the development of 
cognitive modules in terms of a species-wide set of genetically specified 
developmental programs that orchestrate the journey from genotype to 
phenotype, and in particular from genes to massive modularity. This geno-
centric stance might seem to clash unhelpfully with an account of development 
that routinely appeals to the bootstrapping up of basic capacities via cultural 
transmission and cognitive niche construction, and which thereby shifts the 
centre of explanatory gravity away from genetic specification and towards a 
distributed matrix of co-determining genetic and environmental factors. Even 
here, however, there is some hope that the tension may be relieved, if we 
combine the thought that progressive modularization may emerge during 
development and learning (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 1992), with an account of the 
conditions under which, within the sort of distributed developmental matrix just 
                                                 
8 The fitness scores that determine the survival and reproduction prospects in the evolutionary 
scenario are calculated as follows: in each trial an individual scout is rewarded (a) for finding the 
goal itself and (b) if an associated follower drone also reaches the goal, while each drone is 
rewarded (c) for finding the goal itself and (d) if an associated leader scout also reaches the goal. 
Thus it is the achievement of the goal-state that is rewarded directly, and not the specific 
strategies for reaching that state.  
 
9 One might see the drones as constituting a limit case in which the entire control system 
implements a single functionally identified module.    
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highlighted, genes may rightly be said to code for phenotypic traits (Wheeler and 
Clark 1999, Wheeler 2003). Each of these ideas warrants discussion.    
9. Emergent Modularity 
 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) provides a compelling account of how, given the 
plasticity of early neural development, a progressive functional modularization 
may be realized by the brain as part of the developmental process. Evidence 
from cases of early brain damage indicate a degree of baseline neural plasticity 
that goes well beyond that suggested by the evolutionary-psychological image of 
a set of genetically specified modules installed in response to environmental 
triggers. The mind is not prestructured at birth to be modular. Instead, a process 
of modularization is kick-started by a limited range of multi-level domain-
specific predispositions that focus the young infant’s attention on certain 
proprietary inputs. The progressive development of emergent modular 
structures then proceeds interactively as these proprietary inputs in turn affect 
the development of the brain.  
 
A rich example of how functional modularization may be the outcome of 
constrained dynamic interaction during development is provided by Hirsh-
Pasek and Golinkoff’s (1996) three-phase coalition model of language 
comprehension (see also Hollich, Hirsh-Pasek, Tucker and Golinkoff 2000). 
According to this model, infants in the first phase build on rudimentary 
language comprehension achieved during the second half of the first year of life 
to perform an initial segmentation of the flux of their acoustic and visual 
environments. On the basis of dispositions to notice certain acoustic and visual 
cues, alongside a capacity for distributional and correlational analysis across 
phonological and rhythmic patterns of speech, the infant’s task is to parcel up the 
flow of speech around her into acoustic units that will later become linguistically 
relevant, and to use these acoustic units to help her uncover highly significant 
structures in their environments (e.g. important events and objects). The second 
phase involves the interpretation of the acoustic units as components that 
correlate with linguistic categories (such as subject, verb and object), plus the 
mapping of individual word-units onto their referents. In this way, semantics 
dislodges sound as the primary regulator of emerging language comprehension. 
Although during this phase children are beginning to comprehend multi-word 
sentences and the role of word order in determining grammatical relations, such 
advanced comprehension is fragile, in that it depends on all the relevant social, 
semantic and syntactic cues being present. Thus a supporting coalition of 
environmental factors forms a developmentally crucial cognitive scaffold. In the 
third phase this dependency is overcome. The child’s syntactic system becomes 
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fully established, as indicated by the late onset ability to understand linguistic 
constructions that violate word-order assumptions (e.g. the English passive).  
 
For Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff, then, language comprehension is kick-started by 
a system that is primed with dispositions to notice salient inputs and their 
likelihood of occurring together. Functional modularization, in the form of a 
domain-specific, informationally encapsulated system for language 
comprehension, develops progressively through interactive environmental 
engagement. So cognitive modularity may result from distributed developmental 
bootstrapping that potentially involves cultural transmission and cognitive niche 
construction. There seems to be no reason to think that there couldn’t be a large 
number of such modules, so in that sense at least, the human cognitive system 
may be a locus of massive emergent modularity – an emergent cognitive Swiss 
army knife! But now what about the evolutionary-psychological claim that 
cognitive modules are genetically specified? One might think of this as a key 
component of the evolutionary-psychological vision. What remains of this claim 
in the alternative story? The answer, we suggest, is: rather more than you might 
expect.  
 
 
10. Genes, Codes, and Explanatory Spread 
 
There is a generic phenomenon that the present authors once dubbed 
explanatory spread (Wheeler and Clark 1999). Mameli (2005, p.388) gives a 
clear exposition of what it entails.    
 
Causal spread occurs when we discover some new factor causally 
involved in the occurrence of a phenomenon. Explanatory spread 
occurs when we realize that some factor that was not considered to 
be necessary in the explanation of a phenomenon is instead 
explanatorily necessary for that phenomenon. Or, to put it 
differently, explanatory spread occurs when we realize that some 
factor that was not taken to be part of a sufficient explanation of a 
phenomenon needs to be included in such explanation. Since the fact 
that something is causally required does not entail that it is also 
explanatorily required, causal spread does not necessarily lead to 
explanatory spread. But in cases where the newly discovered causal 
factor is deemed to be an important one, causal spread is likely to 
generate the inclusion of the newly discovered factor in any 
sufficient explanation of a phenomenon to which this factor causally 
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contributes. That is, in these cases, causal spread leads to explanatory 
spread.  
 
Where the phenomenon of interest is phenotypic form, the received position is 
that such structure is down to genetic specification. So one would have 
explanatory spread where one discovered a distributed developmental system in 
which non-genetic organismic and/or wider environmental factors made 
explanatorily non-negligible contributions to phenotypic form. That is the 
general picture on offer from approaches that emphasize cultural evolution, 
cognitive niche construction, and (we can now add) emergent modularity.   
 
So what? Crucially, some authors have argued that a proper recognition of 
developmental explanatory spread should lead us to reject the claim that genes 
specify phenotypic traits. Cognitive modules are, of course, examples of 
phenotypic traits, so if this anti-specification argument is sound, it would 
undermine the claim that such modules are genetically specified, and so re-
establish a conflict between our two visions. But is that argument sound? To 
answer that question, let’s consider a specific statement of it:  
 
We have often heard it said that genes contain the “information” that 
specifies a living being… [but] when we say that DNA contains what 
is necessary to specify a living being, we divest these components... 
of their interrelation with the rest of the network. It is the network of 
interactions in its entirety that constitutes and specifies the 
characteristics of a particular cell, and not one of its components. 
That modifications in the components called genes dramatically 
affect the structure is very certain. The error lies in confusing 
essential participation with unique responsibility. By the same token 
one could say that the political constitution of a country determines 
its history. This is obviously absurd. The political constitution is an 
essential component in any history but it does not contain  the 
“information” that specifies that history. (Maturana and Varela 1987, 
p.69) 
 
What is going on here? The first thing to notice (as the opening sentence of the 
above passage indicates) is that to conceive of genes as trait-specifiers is to 
conceive of genes as developmental information-carriers, i.e., as coding for 
phenotypic traits. Thus much here turns on how one understands the nature of 
that coding relationship. It seems to us that Maturana and Varela’s argument 
depends implicitly on a deceptively tempting, but ultimately flawed, view of 
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coding talk that we call strong instructionism (Wheeler and Clark 1999; see also 
Wheeler 2003, 2006). Strong instructionism is the claim that what it means for 
some element to code for an outcome is for that element to fully specify the 
distinctive features of that outcome, where ‘full specification’ requires that those 
distinctive features may be predicted purely on the basis of what may be known 
about the putatively coding factor. In the present context, strong instructionism 
amounts to the claim that what it means for a gene (or a complex of genes) to 
code for a phenotypic trait is for that gene (or complex of genes) to fully specify 
the form of that trait. It is this kind of picture that is seemingly suggested by the 
classic Lorenzian image of the non-genetic material causes in development as the 
bricks and mortar out of which the organism is assembled according to a genetic 
blueprint (Lorenz 1965). However, given the presence of developmental 
explanatory spread (what Maturana and Varela call “the network of interactions 
in its entirety”), the fact is that knowing the entire sequence of an organism’s 
DNA will not be sufficient to predict phenotypic form. It is this point that 
underwrites Maturana and Varela’s observation that the fan of genetic 
information mistakenly confuses “essential participation with unique 
responsibility”. So, if the understanding of genes as coding for phenotypic traits 
is tied to strong instructionism, then, given developmental explanatory spread, 
that understanding is false.10  
 
The trick, then, is to free coding talk about genes from strong instructionism. 
Fortunately, there is plenty of evidence that coding talk in other domains does 
not impose the full-specification condition. Indeed, in familiar cases of 
algorithms, programs, instruction-sets, and other such coding elements, those 
states and processes are able to perform their outcome-generating functions only 
given some assumed backdrop of other causally active states and processes (e.g. 
working operating systems) that themselves bear some of the responsibility for 
the exact form of the outcome produced.  In other words, strong instructionism is 
a spectre without much of a haunting pedigree. That said, a word of warning: we 
                                                 
10 It might seem that strong instructionism about genes is a straw position that no one seriously 
holds. However, the fact is that the idea remains insidiously at work behind commonplace 
metaphors for understanding the relationship between genes and traits. As John Dupre, a 
philosopher of biology and the director of a centre for research on genomics in society (Egenis, 
http://www.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/egenis), comments: “It is still common to hear the genome 
described, for instance, even by eminent experts, as a blueprint for the organism... Perhaps not 
many people will defend the blueprint metaphor very far these days, if pushed, however. A 
common retreat is to the metaphor of a recipe... But this metaphor is still quite inadequate. With 
due allowance for an element of assumed common knowledge, the recipe is a complete set of 
instructions for how to make the cake.” (Dupre 2005, p.198, our emphasis)       
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need to avoid falling into the opposite trap of giving an account of genetic coding 
so excessively liberal, that where explanatory spread is present, too many 
developmental factors qualify as coding for phenotypic outcomes. For then the 
claim that a certain gene (or complex of genes) codes for some trait will simply 
fail to single out that gene (or complex of genes) as performing a distinctive 
developmental function.11  
 
To take just one example (for several others, see Wheeler 2006), say we adopted 
the superficially attractive view that genes code for traits insofar as they are what 
is passed on from one generation to the next in evolution. If we define 
inheritance without an antecedent pro-gene prejudice, as the biological like-
begets-like phenomenon, and so as to fix on elements that are robustly and 
reliably replicated in each generation of a lineage, and that persist long enough 
to be the target of cumulative selection, then the fact seems to be that genes are 
not all that organisms inherit. For example, there are so-called epigenetic 
inheritance systems, such as the inheritance of methylation patterns via a separate 
(from the genetic, that is) copying system; and there is inheritance through host 
imprinting, as when parasitic birds, born in the nest of a host species, imprint on 
that nest as chicks, and then later lay their own eggs in the nest of that species; 
and then there is inheritance via our old friend niche construction, as when beaver 
offspring inherit both the dam that was communally constructed by the previous 
generation and the altered river flow that that physical structure has produced. 
What this indicates is that if being inherited is sufficient for some developmental 
factor to qualify as coding for a phenotypic trait, then non-genetic factors will 
regularly count as coding elements, which violates our excessive liberality 
constraint. 
                                                 
11 A longer justification for why such liberality is excessive goes like this. If the primary goal of 
introducing the concept of genetic coding is to single out genes as privileged causal elements in 
the developmental process, then it might well seem that any successful account of coding talk 
must have the consequence that, of the many causal factors that combine causally during 
development, it is the genes alone that end up coding for phenotypic traits. Elsewhere one of us 
has dubbed this the uniqueness constraint (Wheeler 2006). Griffiths and Knight (1998; see also 
Griffiths 2001)  introduce what is essentially the same constraint in terms of what they call the 
‘parity thesis’. The uniqueness constraint will not be met if either (a) the account of genetic 
coding under consideration fails to deliver the result that genes code for traits, since if genes 
don’t code for traits then they can’t do so uniquely, or (b) that account does deliver the result that 
genes code for traits, but its conditions for what it is to do this are met by other elements in the 
extended developmental system, since then genes won’t be the only developmental elements that 
code for traits. Condition (b) gives expression to the excessive liberality problem. For discussion 
and a more careful formulation of the uniqueness constraint, see Wheeler 2006.   
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There is, of course, much more to be said about this issue. In the present 
treatment we have done little more than sketch the form that an account of 
coding-talk would have to take, if it is to allow genes to code for (and thus, in a 
robust sense, specify) phenotypic traits (including cognitive modules), even in 
the midst of an explanatory spread that involved cultural transmission and 
cognitive niche construction. But, if we can successfully navigate between the 
Scylla of strong instructionism and the Charybdis of excessive liberality, we 
would potentially have access to such an account. Allied with the concept of 
emergent modularity, that result would do much to effect a rapprochement 
between our alternative visions of evolved human cognition.12  
 
 
11. Human Nature Reconsidered 
 
It is time to revisit the evolutionary psychologist’s notion of an evolved universal 
human nature, conceived as a species-wide set of genetically specified 
developmental programs that orchestrate the journey from genotype to 
phenotype. According to this view, a maturing human being, embedded in a 
normal developmental environment, will end up with a particular, species-wide 
set of cognitive modules (allowing for some branching pathways, e.g. between 
the sexes). Significant challenges to this view are posed by the powerful role 
assigned, by cognitive niche construction models, to stacked sequences of 
training environments in the emergence of specific functional modules.13 For 
                                                 
12 Notice that the extended character of certain embodied and situated modules is no barrier to 
this project. Dawkins’ (1982) influential notion of the extended phenotype already shows us how 
genes may be understood as coding for traits that are located outside the skin of the organism 
(e.g. the genes that code for the spider’s web). Beyond that, however, the waters between our sea 
monsters are exceptionally turbulent. For example, the present authors have argued in the past 
(Wheeler and Clark 1999; Wheeler 2003) that what we need is an account of genetic coding based 
on two features of protein synthesis: the arbitrariness of the mappings from particular nucleotide 
triplets to particular amino acids, and the way in which information is consumed by the 
subsystems that implement translation. However, one of us (Wheeler 2006) has subsequently 
argued that once the details of this account are filled in, it turns out that, strictly speaking, it’s not 
molecules of DNA that code in development, but rather the downstream nucleotide triplets out 
of which molecules of mRNA are constructed. It may be that the final route between the dual 
dangers of strong instructionism and excessive liberality is still to be found.  
  
13 For a different way of criticizing the evolutionary-psychological conception of human nature, 
one that identifies an alleged inconsistency between that conception and the population-thinking 
foundations of contemporary neo-Darwinian biology, see Buller 2005. 
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while the early stages of such key developmental trajectories may, as we saw, be 
rather predictably determined by small native biases, the later stages often reflect 
both the cumulative effects of cultural evolution and transmission, and the 
potent effects of the ongoing self-selection of training environments. A child 
whose early experience is shaped by the special environments provided by books 
and software programs, and whose own emerging cognitive profile favours 
certain elements within that culturally-enabled nexus over other elements, will 
end up with a cognitive system that is not just superficially, but profoundly, 
different from that of a differently encultured child. Such a view find expression 
in, for example, Schlesinger and Parisi’s (2007, p.153) notion of an emergent 
constraint according to which: 
 
the outcome of a developmental process need not be programmed in 
by maturation but instead may occur as the result of successive 
learning experiences that the organism determines or selects for 
itself. 
 
The neuroroboticist Olaf Sporns describes the larger situation well, noting that: 
 
[the] architecture of the brain… and the statistics of the environment 
[are] not fixed. Rather, brain-connectivity is subject to a broad 
spectrum of input-, experience-, and activity-dependent processes 
which shape and structure its patterning and strengths (Johnson 
2001). These changes, in turn, result in altered interactions with the 
environment, exerting causal influences on what is experienced and 
sensed in the future. (Sporns 2007, p.179) 
 
This kind of “neuroconstructivist” framework (for a compelling array of worked 
examples, see Mareschal, Johnson, Sirois, Spratling, Thomas and Westermann 
2007; Mareschal, Sirois, Westermann and Johnson 2007) helps locate a potential 
challenge for any notion of an evolved human nature that ties that nature too 
closely to the properties and features of the EEA. For what is special about 
human brains, and what best explains the distinctive features of human 
intelligence, may be precisely their ability (courtesy of extended development 
and extensive neural plasticity) to enter into deep, complex, and ultimately 
architecture-determining relationships with an open-ended variety of culturally 
transmitted practices, endowments, and non-biological constructs, props and 
aids. Perhaps it is because our brains, more than those of any other animal on the 
planet, are primed to seek and consummate such intimate relations with non-
biological resources that we end up as bright and as capable of abstract thought 
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as we are. If so, our distinctive universal human nature, insofar as it exists at all, 
would rather be a nature of biologically-determined openness to deep, learning- 
and development-mediated, change.  
 
It is at this point that we locate a potential challenge to the evolutionary 
psychologists' specific vision of a universal human nature. For that vision, as we 
saw earlier, commits them to a restricted range of potential cognitive modules, 
with that range determined by a suite of genetically specified developmental 
programs. As a result, the range of possible normal variation among cognitive 
modules  is strictly and endogenously limited. By contrast, the constructivist 
vision of horizontally extended and emergent cognitive modules places no such 
clean limits upon the range of variation. Insofar as there is something worth 
calling a universal human nature on this alternative view, that nature lies 
precisely in our continual openness to radical cognitive change. Our fixed nature 
is thus a kind of meta-nature: the suite of capacities, practices, and proclivities 
that enable the development, use, and propagation of a much more open-ended 
set of horizontally extended and emergent cognitive modules. 
 
Such openness, as stressed by recent work in embodied and extended cognition, 
adds important complexity to accounts which emphasize the EEA. For we must 
now take into account a plastic evolutionary overlay which yields a constantly 
moving target, an extended cognitive architecture whose constancy lies mainly in 
its continual openness to change. Even granting that the biological innovations 
which got this ball rolling may have consisted only in some small tweaks to an 
ancestral repertoire, the upshot of this subtle alteration would be a sudden, 
massive leap in cognitive-architectural space: the emergence of a cognitive 
machine intrinsically geared to self-transformation, artifact-based expansion, and 
a snowballing/bootstrapping process of computational and representational 
growth. The machinery of human reason (the environmentally extended 
apparatus of our distinctively human intelligence) could thus turn out to be 
rooted in a biologically incremental progression while simultaneously existing 
on the far side of a precipitous cliff in cognitive-architectural space.  
 
 
12. Conclusions: The Space Between 
 
Such, at least, would be the most radical model, one that indeed locates some 
genuine tension between the evolutionary psychologist’s emphasis on hard 
modules and the EEA, and the cognitive niche constructivist emphasis on 
emergent modularity as reflecting the complex ratchet effects made available by 
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the interplay of neural plasticity, learning, and embodied activity involving 
inherited or self-created environmental structure. 
 
But between these poles of human nature as highly reflective of the specific 
features of the EEA, and human nature as one of extensive openness to training 
and input based modification, lies the full and inviting cognitive space 
structured by the triple helix of culture, embodiment, and genes. Triple helix 
models of mind recognize the role of genetic biases in sculpting key 
developmental trajectories, and the resulting space both for strong forms of 
genetically specified cognitive modularity and for weaker forms of emergent 
modularity resulting from trajectories marked by multiple bouts of culturally 
scaffolded experience and the self-selection of environments. But crucially, the 
triple helix template also invites us to consider, pretty much on a case-by-case 
basis, all points and stations in between. Understanding this spectrum, and 
unravelling the complex interplay between genes, environments, and embodied 
action, will surely be one of the great intellectual adventures of the 21st century.  
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